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The recent judgment in Richard v BBC​[1]​ has excited fears of a new dawn of over-protection of the privacy rights of high profile individuals, and a corresponding diminution in media freedom and the public right to know.​[2]​ The BBC has been refused permission to appeal the decision,​[3]​ and then announced that it will not be appealing the decision.​[4]​ This raises concerns that the decision as it stands might impact negatively on freedom of the media, and deny the higher courts an opportunity to restate that interest in the balance between privacy and freedom of expression, particularly in cases involving the privacy rights of high profile public figures. 

The decision of Mann J raises a number of pertinent issues relating to the balance between individual privacy (especially of high profile figures) and media freedom and the gathering and publication of news; including the level of legitimate expectations of privacy of high-profile individuals and the role and the limits of the public interest defence in cases of this sort. More specifically, it raises questions about the legitimacy of gathering and disclosing details about police investigations, both before arrest and before trial.​[5]​ These issues are, of course, underpinned by a constant dilemma: the media have an undoubted public role to play as public watchdog and as a conduit between news items and the public,​[6]​ but at the same time they are private bodies with private interests. The dilemma is neatly summed up by Lord Donaldson MR:

‘The “Media”… are an essential foundation of any democracy. In exposing crime, anti-social behaviour and hypocrisy and in campaigning for reform and propagating the views of minorities, they perform an invaluable function. However, they are peculiarly vulnerable to the error of confusing the public interest with their own interest. Usually these interests march hand in hand, but not always. In the instant case, pending a trial, it is impossible to see what public interest would be served by publishing the contents of the tapes which would not equally be served by giving them to the police or to the Jockey Club. Any wider publication could only serve the interests of the Daily Mirror.’​[7]​

It is, of course, it is the reaction to that dilemma that will dictate the judiciary’s response to media freedom and the balance between freedom of expression and privacy.​[8]​ In Francome, Lord Donaldson MR sees the press as collaborators, with a duty to report its investigations (on the extent of corruption and illegal betting in the horse racing world) to the police, rather than disseminate them to the public. Such a view, it is suggested, is wholly unrealistic and indeed inconsistent with the role of the media, which is to report on matters of public interest, however they are defined, and to disseminate that information to the public. Obviously, in doing so the media must follow the rules of professional broadcasting, but if we start from the premise that the media are no different than other public bodies - to serve the general public interest and principally to comply with strict standards on how they collate and disseminate information to the public - then the basic tenets of media freedom will be lost.

In UK law, whether public figures, however defined, are successful in claims brought to defend their privacy and private and confidential information is largely dependent on whether there is an overriding public interest in favour of publication.​[9]​ Richard raises issues other than the application of the public interest defence, yet the general tenor of the judgment is formed by the judge’s approach to the desirability of the public dissemination of this information. Thus, whilst the author concedes that ‘celebrity’ privacy is important, and should inform responsible and ethical journalism and broadcasting, it will be argued that this decision - and other decisions from the domestic courts​[10]​ - have unjustifiably rejected case law representing a justifiable and sensible widening of the defence in cases involving high profile individuals.​[11]​  In particular, it will be argued that the judgment is out of line with the inevitable exposure of privacy interests in today’s technology and social media.


The facts and decision in Richard v BBC

The claimant, Sir Cliff Richard claimed damages for breach of his right to privacy against the first defendant BBC and the second defendant police force. The facts were that a BBC journalist had discovered from a confidential source – believed to be someone from the police force that was aware of the police investigation - that the police force was investigating the claimant in respect of an allegation of historical sex abuse.​[12]​ Subsequently, the police had agreed to give the journalist advance notice of a search of the claimant's English property and the BBC then revealed that the claimant was being investigated and produced numerous broadcasts of the search; including the use of helicopters to catch images of the claimant’s property.​[13]​ The police investigation continued for two years, but the claimant was never arrested or charged; and eventually the police admitted liability and agreed to pay £400,000 in damages to the claimant.​[14]​ The High Court had to determine whether there was a legitimate expectation of privacy, whether any interference was justified by the BBC’s right to freedom of expression, and any damages payable by it (including the apportionment of damages between both defendants.​[15]​

The claimant’s legitimate expectation of privacy

Giving judgment, Mann J considered whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the police investigation; the BBC having argued that this was a public event and not deserving of protection. The judge referred to Sir Anthony Clarke’s dicta in Murray v Express Newspapers plc,​[16]​ where he formulated the matters that should be taken into account in deciding whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy:

‘…the question…is a broad one, which takes account of all the circumstances of the case… the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in which the claimant was engaged, the place at which it was happening, the nature and purpose of the intrusion, the absence of consent…the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in which, and the purposes for which the information came into the hands of the publisher.’​[17]​

In the judge’s view, the last two criteria were capable of being very relevant to the present case.​[18]​ The judge found that whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in a police investigation was a fact-sensitive question and was not capable of a universal answer.​[19]​ The judge noted that previous judicial authority was not particularly helpful on this issue,​[20]​ although he stated that the starting point was that a suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to a police investigation. Thus, it was not, as a general rule, necessary for anyone outside the investigating force to know that information, there being potentially damaging consequences of wider knowledge that an accusation had been made against an individual.​[21]​ The fact of an investigation would thus of itself generally carry some stigma,​[22]​ the judge being unconvinced that the general public was universally capable of adopting a completely open- and broad-minded view of the fact of an investigation so that there was no risk of taint either during the investigation or otherwise.​[23]​  Further, the fact that there was a search by a public authority that had been authorized by the court did not, without more, remove that legitimate expectation of privacy.​[24]​

Having stated the general position, the judge firstly dealt with the argument that the claimant was a public figure who had promoted his Christian beliefs in public, and that those facts affected his expectation of privacy. The judge dismissed this on the basis that although a public figure might waive at least a degree of privacy by courting publicity, or adopting a public stance at odds with the privacy rights being claimed, nothing like that applied in this case.​[25]​  The judge also rejected the claim that it was important to consider that this information had fallen into the hands of the media. Here the judge stated that the quality of the information as being private could not, as a matter of principle, be affected by the nature of the recipient, and that there was no basis for saying that a reasonable expectation of privacy was removed simply because the information had reached the hands of the media. In the judge’s view, Sir Cliff’s rights were not based on a reasonable expectation of privacy as long as the information did not fall into the hands of the media; he had a reasonable expectation of privacy full stop.​[26]​  

The balance between privacy and media freedom

The judge then considered the balancing exercise between the claimant’s rights and those of the BBC under Article 10 of the Convention. The judge first considered the supposed ‘duty’ of the media to report on matters of public interest, a duty which had been stressed consistently by the European Court of Human Rights.​[27]​ Thus in Axel Springer v Germany​[28]​  the Court stated that:

‘Although the press must not overstep certain bounds, regarding in particular protection of the rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideals on all matters of public interest.’​[29]​

However, Mann J considered the Court’s use of the word duty as unhelpful in assisting the present court’s debate at this stage, reminding us that the duty of the court was to balance Article 10 against the right to privacy.​[30]​ Mann J then proceeds to consider the criteria set out in Springer without taking into account this overall duty of the press to report. In assessing the relevant criteria, the judge began with the contribution of the expression to a matter of general interest; the BBC’s plea being that that the sexual abuse of children and the BBC’s investigation into it constituted a clear public interest, which was the subject of an ongoing public debate. However the judge dismissed that argument, stressing that any public interest has to be objectively determined, and believing that the BBC were far more impressed by the size of the story and that they had the opportunity to scoop their rivals.​[31]​ This observation is made before the judge considers the claim from two angles: the reporting of the matter as a matter of public interest, and the identification of the individual concerned. However, when he does address these issues, the judge decided that although the information about the inquiry did contribute to a debate of general public interest,​[32]​ it could not be accepted that it was necessary to reveal the claimant’s identity. In his view, knowing that Sir Cliff was under investigation might be of interest to the gossip-mongers, but it did not contribute materially to the genuine public interest in the existence of the police investigations in this area.​[33]​

The judge then considered the public status of the claimant and his prior conduct, stressing that in certain circumstances a person who has placed himself into public life has a diminished expectation of privacy.​[34]​ However it did not follow that there was some sort of across the board diminution of the effect of privacy rights.​[35]​ Specifically, the judge referred to Axel Springer,​[36]​ where the European Court acknowledged that that there were areas of the life of a public person which could appropriately remain private, where for example the material is published merely to satisfy public curiosity.​[37]​ The judge agreed that Sir Cliff’s oft-stated and well-known position as a Christian, promoted by him, might make disclosures of actual conduct which might be regarded as unchristian something to which he has rendered himself vulnerable by virtue of his public position. However, that did not mean that unsubstantiated allegations, or investigations into unproved conduct, fell into the same category.​[38]​ Accepting that the publication of the fact of a criminal investigation search warrant might be thought to be of particular interest because of the contrast between the allegations and Sir Cliff’s public position, the judge also stressed that it was precisely because of that contrast that the publication of the material is capable of being intrusive and so damaging to his reputation.​[39]​ Thus, the criteria of public status and previous conduct were not particularly weighty in this case and that they did no diminish the weight of his privacy rights in respect of the allegations disclosed by the BBC.​[40]​ On the question of the method by which the information was obtained, the judge was critical of the way in which the BBC had acquired it and this clearly weakened the BBC’s position.​[41]​ The judge was also critical of the BBC’s failure to provide the claimant with a right to reply, together with providing the subject with some sort of opportunity to challenge the publication, whether by persuasion or injunction.​[42]​ 

The judge thus concluded that the claimant's privacy rights were not outweighed by the BBC's rights, stressing that the consequences of a disclosure for a person such as the claimant were capable of being very serious and required an equally serious justification.​[43]​ Although the judge recognised that here was a very significant public interest in the fact of police investigations into historic sex abuse, including the fact that they involved public figures,​[44]​ no public interest in identifying those persons existed in the instant case. Knowing Sir Cliff was under investigation might be of interest to gossip-mongers, but that revelation of his identity did not contribute materially to the genuine public interest in the investigation of police investigations in this area.​[45]​  The judge also accepted that to a degree a person who placed himself into the public life had a diminished expectation of privacy, but that depended on the degree of voluntary surrender of privacy, the area of private life and the degree of intrusion.​[46]​ In the present case, the claimant's well-known position as a Christian might make disclosures of actual unchristian conduct something to which he had rendered himself vulnerable by virtue of his public position. However, unsubstantiated allegations or investigations were not in the same category. Thus, although Sir Cliff’s stance on religious issues and might appeal to the ‘curious’ or the prurient, or might provide material for the opinionated, that did not justify an invasion of his privacy.​[47]​ 

The judge then referred to a number of other factors in the balancing exercise, considering firstly that the impact of the invasion had been very materially increased by the nature of the BBC's coverage, which had added drama and a degree of sensationalism.​[48]​ Thus, the BBC went in for an invasion of Sir Cliff’s privacy in a big way.​[49]​ It was also very significant that the publication started with obviously private and sensitive information, obtained from someone who, to the BBC journalist's knowledge, ought not to have revealed it, and confirmed or bolstered with a ploy in the form of a perceived threat by the journalist to the police that he would publish the story before the police search.​[50]​  Although in his view of less weight, the judge noted that the claimant had not been given a fair opportunity to challenge publication before it happened, whether that be by persuasion or by injunction.​[51]​ 

In considering the severity of the sanction on the BBC, the judge rejected the idea that any sanction would have a chilling effect, stating that if Sir Cliff’s Article 8 rights were of greater weight, then imposing any sanction on the BBC would not tilt the balance back in favour of the BBC.​[52]​ More significantly, he considered Section 7 of the BBC’s own editorial guidelines, paying particular attention to the need to balance privacy and the right to broadcast information in the public interest, and, specifically that people in the public eye, in some circumstances, may have a lower expectation of privacy.​[53]​ In examining the Code’s reference to the ‘public interest’ in the context of justifying private information being brought into the public domain, he believed that the BBC had failed to convincingly relate its broadcast to aspects such as the detection or exposing of crime and the protection of people’s health and safety. In any case the BBC’s motives were not relevant as the question whether the broadcast was in the public interest was one for the judge to decide objectively.​[54]​  





In considering damages, the judge stressed that the claimant's life had been hugely affected for almost two years by loss of public status and reputation, embarrassment, stress, upset and hurt, with some consequential health effects.​[57]​ Further, the protection of reputation was part of the function of privacy law as well as defamation law, and in this case the disclosed information was extremely serious, and disclosure had been made more serious, not more justifiable, by the claimant's prominence.​[58]​ This ruling was made despite arguments made on behalf of the BBC that damages for reputation should be the sole province of defamation actions.​[59]​ 

The judge assessed damages at £190,000, which in his view did not require modification so to avoid having a ‘chilling effect’ on the BBC’s right to freedom of expression.​[60]​ Such a sum is far in excess to that awarded by the domestic courts in Mosley,​[61]​ and Campbell,​[62]​ but the judge justified the sum on the basis of the damage to his health, dignity and reputation, the adverse effect on his lifestyle, the nature and content of the private information that was revealed and the scope and sensationalist presentation of the story.​[63]​ 

The judgment in Richard, legitimate expectations and public interest defence

The success of a privacy claim depend not simply on the issue of public interest, but, initially, on whether the claimant has a legitimate expectation of privacy.​[64]​ It should also be stressed that unless the claimant can prove that a legitimate expectation of privacy, the court will dismiss the action and will not conduct the relevant balancing exercise between privacy and free speech.​[65]​ Further, even in the case where Article 8 is engaged, the possibility that such rights are reduced because of public status will strengthen the free speech claim when the court conducts its ultimate balancing exercise. Both these aspects were very relevant in the Richard case and the judge decided both issues clearly in favour of the claimant. What needs to be considered at this stage, therefore, is the impact of these findings on the availability of the public interest defence and, more generally, on the right (or duty) of the media to report on current news items.

Before criticising the judgment of Mann J, and other domestic judgments, it is clear that in an attempt to distinguish between what is in the public interest and what the public are interested in, the public interest defence has been limited to matters which appear to have some genuine political, legal, constitutional, social or economic relevance and thus whether the publication is capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society. That question is almost inevitably tied to the question of whether the individual is a public figure, in other words one who carries out public functions. Thus in Van Hannover v Germany​[66]​ the European Court stated that:

‘...a fundamental distinction needs to be made between reporting facts – even controversial ones - capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society relating to politicians in the exercise of their public functions, for example, and reporting details of the private life of an individual who ... does not exercise official functions.’​[67]​

Secondly, that Court stated that the decisive factor in the balance between the protection of private life and freedom of expression should lie in the contribution that [the published photos and articles] make to a debate of general interest.​[68]​ Thus, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights has noted,​[69]​ the courts have attempted to place political and other public interest matters in the public interest category, whilst excluding information, perhaps relating to a person’s private life, which the public may be merely curious about. 

In A v B plc and another,​[70]​ Lord Woolf CJ, found that a professional footballer who was seeking an injunction to keep an extra-marital affair out of the public domain was a public figure and must expect and accept that even trivial facts could be of great interest to readers and other observers of the media. In such circumstances, in his Lordship’s view, the public had an understandable and so a legitimate interest (italics added) in being told the information.​[71]​ This view was however overturned by subsequent case law which denied a general public interest in the publication of information relating to the private lives of well-known individuals. In Campbell v MGN Ltd,​[72]​ the House of Lords found that it was not enough to deprive an international model of her right to privacy that she was a celebrity and that her private life was newsworthy.​[73]​ Further, the decision in Von Hannover v Germany​[74]​ had an instant impact on the jurisprudence of the domestic courts, and in McKennitt v Ash,​[75]​ Eady J stressed that there was a significant shift taking place between freedom of expression for the media and the corresponding interest of the public to receive information and the legitimate expectation of citizens to have their private lives protected. Thus, post-Von Hannover, the public had no right to be informed of the misdemeanours and activities of celebrities on the basis that such people were role models and that the public had a genuine, thus legitimate interest in receiving such information.​[76]​ In Von Hannover the European Court restricted the public interest defence to matters of genuine, and more formal, political and public concern; in most cases, therefore, excluding information relating to the private lives of celebrities. 

This distinction, however, is considerably more difficult to apply in practice, and subsequent cases have applied the public interest defence to the publication of details relating to the private lives of many well known figures in the world of entertainment and sport, and thus have extended the defence to matters that are of interest to the public. This has covered revelations relating to the private lives of, for example, footballers, who although not fulfilling as vital a role in public life as politicians and public officials, nevertheless excite public interest in activities beyond their central roles because of their public status. This might, perhaps, in appropriate cases, justify publication of limited material relating to their private lives,​[77]​ accepting that their behaviour was a matter of some public interest because of their additional roles, aside from their status as footballers.

Further, some decisions of the Grand Chamber of the European Court have extended the public interest defence in cases where the individual in question is simply well known to the public. In Von Hannover v Germany (No 2)​[78]​ the Grand Chamber accepted that the applicants, particularly Princess Caroline, were public figures because of their fame. This was because, irrespective of the question to what extent the applicants assumed official functions on behalf of the Principality of Monaco, it could not be claimed that the applicants, who were undeniably well known, were ordinary private individuals (italics added).​[79]​ Equally, in Axel Springer v Germany​[80]​ – a case concerned with the publication of certain details about a well-known television actor’s arrest and conviction – it considered that the actor was sufficiently well known to qualify as a public figure; and this reinforced the public’s interest in being informed of his arrest and the proceedings against him.​[81]​ Further, whilst accepting that the newspaper’s interest in publishing the articles was solely due precisely to the fact that it was a well-known actor who had committed the offence – which would not have been reported on if committed by a person unknown to the public – the actor had been arrested in public at the Munich Beer festival.​[82]​

The Grand Chamber appear firstly to apply the accepted distinction between pure public figures and private individuals and the distinction between public interest and what the public are interested in, or curious about. However, this is where the published photos and accompanying commentaries relate exclusively to details of the person’s private life and have the sole aim of satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership in that respect.​[83]​ However, when applying those principles to the present facts, the Grand Chamber took exception to the domestic courts’ rejection of the newspapers’ argument that the actor was a public figure and appears to accept the legitimacy of public interest in such figures:

‘...whilst it can be said that the public does not generally make a distinction between an actor and the character he or she plays, there may nonetheless be a close link between the popularity of the actor in question and his or her character…That fact was such as to increase the public’s interest in being informed of [X’s] arrest for a criminal offence.  Having regard to those factors and to the terms employed by the domestic courts in assessing the degree to which X was known to the public, the Court considers that he was sufficiently well known to qualify as a public figure. That consideration thus reinforces the public’s interest in being informed of X’s arrest and of the criminal proceedings against him.’​[84]​

Thus, following Springer, whilst it seems clear that discussions relating to political figures will attract a greater public interest than in respect of other public figures, the Court is prepared to make a clear distinction between well-known public figures – whether or not they are politicians or public officials - and the private individual. Further, having made that distinction it is then prepared to accept that there may be a legitimate level of public interest in that person’s actions.​[85]​ In that sense Springer represents a pragmatic and legally moral acceptance of a general public interest in the activities of persons who cannot be regarded as private individuals, and who cannot expect the media or the public to refrain from investigating and reading material relating to what otherwise would be regarded as their private lives.​[86]​ These decisions appear to establish that although matters relating to these public figures and certain aspects of their private lives may not be of vital importance and public interest, it is sufficiently so to warrant the application of a public interest test provided the intrusion into private life is not too great.​[87]​

The distinction between public officials and public celebrities, and information of genuine public concern can cause some unfairness where the claimant has a high public profile and where the ‘private’ activity in question may well be considered unconscionable, if not unlawful.​[88]​ However, there is a danger that the domestic courts can be overly influenced by the tactics employed by the defendants, and give too little weight to the legitimate exposure of unconscionable conduct. This in turn has further weakened the strength of the public interest defence; with the courts labelling the public’s interest in the information as mere inquisitiveness, and denying any public interest defence.​[89]​ This is particularly the case where the private information in question relates to the sexual activities of public figures, ​[90]​ where in the absence of a strong and genuine public interest going beyond public curiosity or personal malice, there will be no public interest in publication.​[91]​ Thus in PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd.​[92]​ the Supreme Court held that disclosure or publication of purely private sexual encounters would, on the face of it, constitute the tort of invasion of privacy, and that repetition of such disclosure or publication on further occasions was capable of constituting a further invasion of privacy; there being no general public interest in the revelation of those details.​[93]​ The decision thus reaffirms the approach that in the absence of a strong and genuine public interest going beyond public curiosity or personal malice, there will be no public interest in publication.​[94]​ This approach may be acceptable where the information in question relates to sexual behaviour, but in cases such as Richard, where the details relate to the investigation of matters of great public interest and where the claimant’s public profile will cause an inevitable increase in public interest, it is unrealistic to treat the claimant as a private individual simply because their activities are not affiliated with any public function.​[95]​

It is submitted, therefore, that in cases which affect public figures, a strict demarcation between the public interest and what the public are interested in, provides too little protection of the public’s right to know. In Mosley,​[96]​ the domestic courts ruled that the newspapers’ tactics and publication were disproportionate despite the status of the claimant and the potential public interest issues which the articles referred to. It is submitted that although the court was entitled to come to that conclusion on the facts, given the possible unconscionable and disproportionate nature of those revelations, the court should not have ignored the public profile of that individual. This would allow the courts to take into consideration the inevitable public interest in that person and their activities  and grant the press a greater although not unlimited, discretion in the manner in which they research and publish those details. It would also allow the courts to give greater recognition to the public right to know where they have found that despite the existence of a genuine public interest in publication, such an interest did not outweigh the privacy rights of the public figure.​[97]​ 

Turning to the judgment in Richard, the main criticisms of the judgment stem from the judge’s refusal to give due consideration to the fundamental importance of the public interest in the investigation and reporting of this matter, and the resulting dilution of the essential principles of press freedom. The author concedes that the BBC might, in all the circumstances, have crossed the line between media freedom and respect for individual privacy, particularly as the information in question was based on unsubstantiated allegations. However, it is suggested that the judge’s approach towards broadcasting freedom led to a decision which was arguably both unbalanced and damaging to media freedom and the public’s right to be informed of matters of public interest. 

The criticisms of the judgment on the balancing exercise can be summarised broadly as follows. First, the judge rejects the idea that the information in question, and the claimant’s privacy, were unaffected by the fact that the media had acquired the information. Thus, in his view, Sir Cliff’s rights were not based on a reasonable expectation of privacy as long as the information did not fall into the hands of the media; he had a reasonable expectation of privacy full stop.​[98]​  This, it is submitted, fails to appreciate the difference between the roles, and duties of the police and the media. Those roles are fundamentally different and it is the duty of the media to have regard to freedom of expression and the public right to know as prime factors in deciding whether to disseminate that information. Thus, in Jersild v Denmark​[99]​ the European Court stressed that although certain speech (in this case of a racist nature) was not protected generally, the media fulfilled an essential function in identifying to the public that certain people exist and were thus protected in broadcasting such views.​[100]​ To deny that an individual’s expectation of privacy is unaffected by the fact that the media have acquired the information is surely erroneous; whilst the police might have a duty to keep those details out of the public domain, it is surely not expected - as a basic premise - that the media will keep that information secret, or indeed share it with other public authorities. 

Secondly, the judge rejects the notion that the BBC and the media generally had a duty to investigate and broadcast the material, considering that the European Court’s use of the word was unhelpful in assisting the present court’s duty to balance Article 10 against the right to privacy.​[101]​ Accordingly, Mann J proceeds to consider the balancing criteria without taking into account this overall duty of the press to report. Although this appears to follow the domestic case law concerning the balance between the respective rights,​[102]​ it is argued that ignoring argument that the claim of the press in the exercise is not only a right but a duty fails to give sufficient weight to the importance of the Article 10 right when it is being exercised by the media.  Further, it appears unfair, that having accepted that the claimant’s expectation of privacy has been damaged further by its interference by the media that the countervailing argument on behalf of the media is not given appropriate recognition. Further, the judge found that there was no positive obligation on the BBC to report; thereby rejecting the BBC’s claim that it would have been criticised for not broadcasting the matter.​[103]​ This finding reveals a fundamental confusion with the BBC’s argument. It is not suggested that the BBC would be accused of breaching any legal duty in not reporting the story; or that the BBC would only be concerned if it was accused of such. The BBC, as part of the media, felt that it had a moral and ethical duty to broadcast the story. That is not part of their legal or other duties as yet another public body; it is its duty as a public watchdog, and the BBC are right in suggesting that the public would be very critical of its failure to report; particularly given the media and others’ failure or inability to reveal even the existence of the Savile scandal. It is without question the duty of the media to make decisions on what should be broadcast in the public interest, and the fact that they may get the balance wrong and be corrected by the courts, should not deny them that special status in the balancing exercise.

Fourthly, the judge found that on the facts neither the public status of the claimant nor his previous conduct and views were particularly weighty in this case so as to diminish the weight of his privacy rights in respect of the allegations disclosed by the BBC.​[104]​ It is argued that this gives too little weight to both Sir Cliff’s public status (and the European Court’s assessment of that factor in its case law) and the fact that his position on Christianity would create a natural increase in the public interest in the story. In both respects, and in respect of the public interest factor, the judge accuses the media, and the public, of curiosity and prurience, and thus denies - as opposed to qualify - the availability of the public interest defence. Such a finding is difficult to reason once it has been accepted that the investigations into sexual abuse involving high profile public individuals was a matter of undoubted public interest.

Fifthly, and more specifically, the judge noted that the claimant had not been given a fair opportunity to challenge publication before it happened, whether that be by persuasion or by injunction.​[105]​ This aspect of the judgment, it is argued, is contrary to the decision in Moseley v United Kingdom,​[106]​ where the European Court clearly state that the media are not under a general duty to give such notification, and that UK law is not in breach of Article 8 by not providing the claimant with such a right.​[107]​ It is also argued that the judge’s reaction to the tactics employed by the BBC has led to him ignoring the public interest element of the broadcast and the finding that the investigation concerned matters which were part of an undoubted and serious public debate. Although it is valid to consider press tactics and motives in assessing the proportionality of the media’s invasion into individual privacy, the courts should not be allowed to reject the public interest element of the broadcast for that reason alone.





Media tactics, irresponsible broadcasting and the loss of the public interest defence

Without question Mann J’s judgment in Richard relies heavily on the tactics employed by the BBC in the gathering and dissemination of the story. This begs the question to what extent such a factor is relevant in the balancing exercise, and whether a public interest story and defence should be tainted by what the court regards as irresponsible broadcasting. That such factors are relevant in the balancing exercise is without question, and the recent decision in Ali v Channel 5 Broadcast Ltd,​[111]​ has reminded broadcasting companies that they need to be careful to balance individual privacy with their desire to inform the public on matters of public interest. The case is an interesting one with respect to the application of broadcasters’ duties to report matters responsibly and in line with privacy rights, and to contrast with Richard.

In Ali, as a result of rent arrears, the claimants' landlord had obtained a possession order for the property they occupied. When enforcement officers attended the property to evict the claimants they were accompanied by the defendant's film crew, who then broadcast edited footage as part of a series of programmes called "Can't Pay? We'll take it away". The programme was seen by 9.65 million viewers and as a consequence the claimants' daughter suffered bullying at school. The High Court found that the claimants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the information in question, and that the principle of open justice did not justify the broadcasting of information beyond the bare fact of the eviction.​[112]​ Thus, what happened when the warrant was executed was not part of the court proceedings and thus could not be regarded as a public process or event. ​[113]​ Nor, in the court’s view, could the impact on the claimants' children be justified by reference to open justice. The broadcasting of the information was not a foreseeable consequence of the claimants' failure to comply with the possession order.​[114]​

Although the court accepted that the programme contributed to a debate of general interest, it found that the inclusion of the claimant's private information went beyond what was justified for that purpose. The programme's focus was not on the matters of public interest, but on the drama of the conflict between the claimants and the landlord's father.​[115]​ Moreover, that conflict had been encouraged by one of the enforcement officers to "make good television." The defendant had editorial discretion as to the way in which it told the story, but that discretion did not extend to its decision to include the private information of which the claimants' complained unless it was justified as contributing to a debate of general interest.​[116]​ On the facts the balance came down in favour of protecting the claimants' Article 8 rights and the defendant had failed to convince the court that this intrusion was justified and proportionate.​[117]​ 

This finding, almost without question correct on the facts, should be clearly distinguished from Richard. In Ali the claimant was a private individual and the matter being broadcast was nowhere near in the same public interest category as the investigation of sexual abuse.​[118]​ In privacy versus media freedom cases a key factor in determining whether the interference is proportionate and necessary is the extent to which the broadcast or other public dissemination serves the public interest. In this sense, the court’s finding in Ali that the programme, albeit made for public interest purposes (an investigation into debt), was not focussed was on those matters of public interest - but rather on the drama of the conflict between the claimants and the landlord's father – is of potential concern to broadcasters. The court accepted that the conflict between the tenants and the landlord had been encouraged by one of the enforcement officers to "make good television" - thus reducing the genuine public interest in making and broadcasting the programme. This distinction, it is submitted, will be very difficult to maintain in practice, as many public interest stories are presented with mixed motives – to inform the public and to score political or personal points – and provided the media or other publisher has not lost sight of their duty to inform the public the law should offer a defence. In the context of television programmes such as the one in Ali, it is inevitable that the programme is being made for both informative and entertainment purposes, and for the courts to try and ascertain which of those purposes dominated in a particular case will be both difficult and potentially unfair. 

In attempting to impose standards of responsible broadcasting on programme makers the decision in Ali, and in Richard, are unobjectionable. Such standards are imposed on and by broadcasting authorities; and by the courts in areas such as defamation, contempt of court and indeed in privacy actions generally.​[119]​ These recent cases take into account that the purpose of the programme is to entertain in reducing the public interest nature of the broadcast. Further, certain programmes made by certain companies (and broadcast on certain channels) will be assumed to have been made for purely financial or prurient reasons. This might lead to decisions being made on unfair or unprincipled purposes, and the decisions in Ali and indeed Richard will be of concern to programme makers who seek to combine public education and entertainment.





In many respects, the Richard case is not an ideal one to discuss the delicate balance between public figure privacy and media freedom; and to promote the fundamental principles of free speech and the public’s right to receive information in that balance.  Given the tactics employed by the BBC and the depth of intrusion into the claimant’s private and home life the case is perhaps not one where the benefits of media freedom can be most robustly argued. Indeed the case warns us of the potential for abuse by the media and the need to protect individual privacy from the media’s tendency to confuse its duty to inform with its own private, and occasionally personal, intentions. Yet given the unequivocal nature of the ruling, and the robust attack on the tactics and motives employed by the BBC, the judgment can be criticised for giving insufficient regard to some fundamental principles of media freedom and skewing the balance between freedom of expression and privacy. If that is the case then the judgment may truly have a ‘chilling effect’ on media freedom and the public right to know. 

It has been argued principally that the judgment gives too little weight to the public interest of the matter under investigation and the BBC’s investigation and reporting of it. To ignore – rather than qualify - the importance of that element because the BBC were seen to have acted hastily, irresponsibly and for their own purposes, led to an unfair balancing exercise between the two conflicting interests. More specifically, it is submitted that the courts often err in placing too much emphasis on the tactics that the media employ in reporting stories on high profile individuals, together with the media’s motives for doing so. ‘Sensationalist’ reporting, it is argued, is inevitable in such stories and should not be used to deny that the media are pursuing, and the public gaining, a legitimate public interest in its reporting of such stories. This is particularly so when the distinction between providing the public with information on the one hand, and reporting for purposes of entertainment and sensationalism on the other, are difficult to maintain in practice.

With respect to damages, although the level of the award might not be clearly in breach of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights,​[122]​ it is submitted that the award takes too little notice of the public interest nature of the investigation, and too much weight to the BBC’s inevitable desire to broadcast the story as a scoop. This last factor is clearly evident when, in considering the claim for aggravated damages, the judge held that the fact that the BBC had submitted the broadcast for a television award - promoting its own infringing activity in a way that demonstrated that it was extremely proud of it - had caused additional distress to the claimant, and awarding aggravated damages of £20,000 to the claimant.​[123]​ Again it is submitted that the judge’s findings are inconsistent with the reality of broadcasting ground-breaking stories on matters of undoubted public interest and debate, and thus represent an unfair skewering of the balance between privacy and media freedom.​[124]​
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